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by
Nigel J. BRAILEY**
Of all Asian countries In the nineteenth century, Thailand provides one of the most
interesting, instructive, and yet still neglected examples of the interaction of very different
cultures and ideas, Oriental with Western. All sorts of questions arise as to how, when
all the countries around it were falling under what at first seemed like the blanket of Western
rule, 'Siam', as it was then known, managed to corne to terms with the West, thereby main-
taining both its independence and cultural identity. This is an attempt to answer some of
these questions with reference to the crucial field of government.
A sudden relative wealth of historical research has erupted in recent years, concerned
with Siam in this remarkable period. Much of it has been inspired by the pioneering work
amongst Thai language materials, both published and documentary, of W. F. Vella,!) Neon
Snidvongs,2) and D. K. Wyatt.3) A wide variety of topics have now been attacked, most
of them already complete, though some still in progress. The theses of Busakorn Lailert
on the internal affairs of the mainly eighteenth century Ban Phlu Luang dynasty,4) and
Akin Rabibhadana on Thai society under the succeeding Bangkok Chakri dynasty up to
1873,5) provide detailed explanations of the character of traditional government in Siam.
For the nineteenth century specifically, there are two base works written from the Bangkok
point of view; firstly, Constance Wilson's thesis on the reign of King Mongkut,6) which is
* The present work for this paper in Thailand and the United States in 1966-67 and 1970 was financed by
the Nuffield Foundation through the London-Cornell Association, South East Asia Project and the Kansai
Economic Research Center through the Center for Southeast Asian Studies, Kyoto University. The
author is most grateful to both Organizations.
** Department of History, University of Bristol, England.
1) W. F. Vella, The Impact of the West on Government in Thaziand. 1955.
. ,)iam under Rama III. 1957.
2) Neon Snidvongs, The De7)elopment of Siamese Relations with Britain and France in the Reign of Maha
1I10ngkut, 1851--68. Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, London, 1961.
3) D. K. Wyatt, The Politics of Reform z'n Thailand. 1969.
4) Busakorn Lailert, The Ban Phlu Luang Dynasty, 1688-1767. Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, London,
1972.
5) Akin Rabibhadana, The Organizatz'on of Thai Society in the Early Bangkok Period} 1782-1873. Cornell
Data Paper, 1969.
6) C. M. Wilson, State and Society in the Reign of Mongkut} 1851-68. Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Cornell,
1970.
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portrayed as, in general, a rather static period, with Siam responding only where necessary
to the Western impact which really only began in that reign and remained quite limited to
its end; and secondly, Tej Bunnag's on the highly dynamic role of Prince Damrong at King
Chulalongkorn's new Interior Ministry, 1892-1915,7) perhaps the real climax of the Siamese
response before the 1932 return to a relatively passive bureaucratic system as demonstrated
by Siffin.8)
Additionally, we have various accounts concerned with what are, or were once, regional
points of view; Sharom bin Ahmat has written on one ex-dependency, Kedah, and its re-
lations with Bangkok,9) and David Chandler has given us a preview on another, Cambodia.l0)
Kennon Breazeale is at work on Northeast Thailand affairs, while my own thesis on Northern
Thailand, or 'Western Laos', up to 1892,11) has been followed by Ansil Ramsay's, primarily
concerned with Damrong's innovations as they affected the same area post-1892.l2)
In terms of the 'modernization' of Siam, and the maintenance of its independence, various
different periods have been seen as the most critical, with each historian naturally influenced
in his choice by the topic he chose to deal with. To my mind, the mid-1880's claim that
role, as I assert below, but I would nevertheless like to acknowledge here how much I have
gained in breadth of perspective, and also understanding of the specific role of Chiengmai
III modern Thai history, both from the above writers and many others.
For my work on Western Laos, two extreme approaches might have been possible, fol-
lowing the dIvision indicated above; that concentrating on the local point of view, of an
historic political entity in the process of submergence within the expanding 'modern' Thailand;
or alternatively, as a mere exemplary object of developing Bangkok 'control' policies. From
the start, it seemed to me that the most valid approach so far as Chiengmai was concerned
lay somewhere in between, both in terms of its own ultimate fate, and the broader, Thailand
viewpoint. The purely local approach would have appeared a mere exercise in sentiment,
with by no means the same validity as with Kedah and Cambodia, which each ultimately
escaped the Siamese tentacles, and maintain today a separate political identity. Practical
problems also presented themselves, particularly the lack of a clear terminal date, short
of 1932, or possibly 1915.
7) Tej Bunnag, The Provincial Administration of Siam from 1892-1915. Unpublished D.Phil. thesis,
Oxford, 1968.
8) W. J. Siffin, The Thai Bureaucracy: Institutional Change and Development. 1966.
9) S. bin Ahmat, Tradition and Change in a ffifalay State: The Economic and Polz'tical Development of
Kedah, 1879-1923. Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, London, 1969.
. "Kedah-Siam Relations, 1821-1905," JSS (Journal of the Siam Society) 59, pt. 1, 97-
117. d. also R. Bonney's specifically Malay-oriented Kedah, 1771-1821. 1971.
10) D. Chandler, "Cambodia's Relations with Siam in the Early Bangkok Period: The Politics of a Tributary
State," JSS 60, pt. 1, 153--169.
11) N. J. Brailey, The Origins of the Siamese Forward Movement in f1;-estern Laos] 1850-92. Unpublished
Ph.D. thesis, London, 1969.
12) A. Ramsay, The Development of a Bureaucratic PoNty; The Case of Northern Siam. Unpublished
Ph.D. thesis, Cornell, 1971.
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With regard to the other extreme, what follows should serve to emphasize that in 1850,
even 1870, Chiengmai was itself still very clearly a distinct political entity, and by the latter
date was also demonstrably Bangkok's most important tributary, or dependent state, follow-
ing the French establishment of a protectorate over Cambodia. Because of this, at least
up until 1885, it appears to have been the chief object of the developing Siamese administrative
centralization policy, and therefore largely responsible for its character. Even up until
1890, it would appear to have been of as much concern to Bangkok as any of the outer de-
pendencies, and thus worthy of being the focus of study in this context. But subsequently,
a combination of both internal factors and external problems, often interconnected, caused
greater emphasis to be placed by Bangkok in turn on other outer dependencies, and then
the heartland of Siam Proper. The initiative in Chiengmai and the rest of Western Laos
almost died, and when, towards the end of the 1890's, it was revived, it seems to have been
inspired chiefly by a desire to achieve uniformity, to extend an already almost perfected
system to one of the last remaining exceptions. It is, therefore, during the period 1850-
1890 that the Bangkok-Chiengmai relationship is of most interest with regard to the shaping
of policy in the Siamese capital.
The first characteristic of the Bangkok-Chiengmai relationship pre-1850 worthy of
note, is that it can hardly be described as historic or traditional. In fact, it dated back only
as far as 1774,13) and was therefore a creation of the Thonburi-Bangkok period, whereas
all other regions of modern Thailand date their connection well back into Ayuthya times
(mid-fourteenth to mid-eighteenth centuries). The other areas which were the object of con-
temporary Siamese ambitions, Eastern Laos and Cambodia, became again separated for
the most part subsequently.
Moreover, the nature of the relationship's inception is important, not least because
it is so often misrepresented, but also because it explains much about the relationship that
ensued. It is, indeed, a commonplace to find in modern Bangkok Thai histories brief re-
ferences to the Siamese 'conquest' of Western Laos in 1774,14) following which the area
only receives mention when its affairs directly affect the interests of the Siamese capital,
as if it had at once been converted into an integral part of Siam.
A very different picture emerges from Siamese chronicle-histories compiled before
the First World War.15) In 1774, a period of Burmese rule had just attained a decade.
13) Prachakitkorachak, Phraya (Chern Bunnag), Phongsawadan Yonok. Bangkok, 1961. 477.
14) For instance, Prince Chula Chakrabongse's Lords of Lzje. 1960. 74, or Prayun Phitsanukha, Somdet
Phrachao Taksz"n Maharat. Bangkok, 1970. II, 9-31, which, even though a much more detailed account,
still gives the same impression. M.L. Manich Chumsai's History of Laos (z"ncluding the history ofLannathai,
Chiengmai). Bangkok, 1967, simply ignores the region after 1567.
On the other hand, Sangiem Khum- phawat, Rachapradzphat nai Somdet Phra pzya Maharat (Royal
Unions in the Reign of the Greatly Beloved King). Bangkok, 1969. 522-3, provides a quite realistic
assessment of the 'vacillating' Western Lao attitude towards Bangkok.
15) In their modern editions: Prachakitkorachak, op.c£t., 473--9; Maha Ammat, Phraya (Run Sipen),
Phongsawadan Chiengmai, Lampang, Lamphunchai in Prachum Phongsawadan, III. Bangkok, 1963. 88.
cf. also: C. Notton, Chronique de Chz"engmai. 1932. 199-200.
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All the various towns in the region had been captured back in the early 1760's to serve as
advance bases for the invasion of Ayuthya, and had in addition to supply local levies as
support forces. When, however, the Chinese invasions of Burma of 1766-69 forced Burmese
withdrawal from prostrate Siam, sizeable detachments nevertheless remained in Western
Laos ready for a renewal of the invasion in due course. And while Western Lao dependence
on Burma was by no means unprecedented; it had been the rule indeed for most of the pre-
ceding two centuries; a continuing Burmese presence on this scale, and the amount of political
interference with the local authorities that it represented, seemingly was. Taksin, the King
reviving Siam from his Thonburi capital, perhaps recalled the despairing call for help to
Ayuthya from the small Western Lao state of Lamphun back in 1763,16) but in 1771 he
met with no local response as he marched north, and his attack on the Burmese at Chiengmai
that year was a failure. It was only in 1774 when, finally, the Lao nobility of Chiengmai
and its neighbour, Lampang, decided that Burmese rule had become intolerable, and staged
a plot that ended with the gates of the two towns being opened to Siamese troops, that a
regular relationship was initiated on a basis of mutual interest.
N or would it be wise to view the agreement of 1774 and the mutual interests it enshrined
simply against the events of the previous decade. In this context, the whole specific Northern
Thai tradition is relevant, above all the concept of 'Lannathai'. The latter, as a kingdom,
was founded at Chiengmai in 1296 by King Mangrai, at times extended even beyond Western
Laos17) into the Shan States of modern Burma, and stood heir to the even older Hariphunchai
tradition of the Mon people, with whom then, for nearly three centuries, the immigrant Thai
worked their own particular cultural mix. The last of these three centuries saw almost in-
cessant warfare with Lannathai's younger, and ostensibly stronger lowland rival to the
south, Ayuthya, based on the Chaophraya valley. Much devastation was undoubtedly
caused, but it was not to Ayuthya that Lannathai ultimately succumbed, in 1556, but to
the Burmese again, and their exhausting struggle probably contributed to Ayuthya's collapse
III turn, thirteen years later, to the all-conquering Burmese ruler, Bayinnaung.l8)
But again, no long-term community of experience stemmed from this momentary parallel
fate. After little more than a decade, Ayuthya resumed its political independence, while
Chiengmai and the rest of former Lannathai remained, except for brief intervals, within
the Burmese sphere. Burmese cultural influence probably went into decline when actual
Burmese political rule was succeeded by local Lao leadership in the early seventeenth century,
but the various Lao successor states to Lannathai continued to pay regular tribute to the
16) Boromanuchit Chinorot, Krom Phra, Phra-rachaphongsawadan Krung Si Ayuthya. Bangkok, 1961.
II, 267.
17) 'Western Laos', a term in common nineteenth century Siamese use, is here taken to signify the mountain-
ous region of Northern Thailand dissected by the valleys of the Ping, Wang, Yom and Nan, principal
tributaries to the Chaophraya river, plus the Chiengrai-Chiengsen plain draining into the Mekhong river.
Each of the valleys was dominated by one town; the Wang by Lampang, Yom by Phre, Nan by the town
of Nan, except the Ping, shared between Chiengmai and the much smaller Lamphun.
18) W. A. R. Wood, History uf Siam. 1959. Chapters 4-8.
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Burmese court along with a host of other Burmese dependencies westwards to the edge of
the Irrawaddy valley. vVhen offered the alternative of joining Ayuthya in the early 1660's,
in the course of a Burmo-Siamese war, the Chiengmai rulers declined the opportunity, and
the preliminary eighteenth century break with Burma, in 1727, carne about at a time of
at least relative weakness simultaneously in both Burma and Siam.l9)
As a result of their different historical experiences by the eighteenth century, the Western
Lao or 'Thai Yuan' and the Siamese still spoke mutually unintelligible dialects of Thai, and
wrote them in mutually unintelligible scripts. In terms of customs, the Siamese subsisted
on non-glutinous rice, the Lao on 'sticky' or glutinous rice, Siamese women, hair en brosse,
dressed in the phanung, or divided skirt, their long-haired Lao sisters in the full-skirted
phasin, and amongst the elite class at least, enjoyed some surviving matrilineal traditions.
The separate monastic hierarchies in each Lao state administered a monkhood displaying
much greater Mahayanist Buddhist doctrinal influences than its Siamese counterpart,20)
and the respective monastic building styles demonstrated above all the contrary cultural links ;
Siam with Cambodia, Western Laos with the Shan States and Burma.
But the Lao had a strategic problem. Ideally, as in their last shortlived period of
independence, 1727-63, they would have preferred to settle their own affairs. But they no
longer had any claim to major power status, even by South East Asian standards. Lack
of access to the sea, and limited agricultural land much segmented by mountains prevented
further population growth and contributed to local feuds. As for Burmese and Siamese
weakness, and the existence of a friendly 'Mon' state at the mouth of the Salween river
in the 1740's and 1750's, these were exceptional circumstances. The Western Lao could
not normally hope even to operate the 'two-headed bird' or 'lord of two skies' role, common
among the Mekhong valley states, of paying tribute simultaneously to their greater neigh-
bours; Burmo-Siamese irreconcilability was consistently just too pronounced for this sort
of accommodation occasionally accepted by Siam and Vietnam. Often, in face of over-
whelming force, usually Burmese, no real choice of suzerain was offered. But when a real
choice was possible, what the events mentioned above do seem to indicate, very interestingly,
is that the Lao preferred the weaker party, again also normally Burma, for the sake of the
internal autonomy allowed them. For the same reason in 1773-4, at a time of effectively
direct Burmese rule, they chose to invite the Siamese in.
Two aspects must be considered briefly with reference to the Lao-Siamese relationship
that followed; the nature of traditional Siamese policy towards tributary states, and the
much broader one of general international relations in pre-modern South East Asia, both
of which have lacked any extensive general study hitherto. So far as the latter is concerned,
a tendency has developed recently, it seems, to view tributary relationships in the area as
19) Notton, op.cit., 171-18I.
20) Anuman Rajadhon, Phraya, Essays on Thai Folklore, 1968. 24.
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a whole, if not as smaller-scale versions of the Chinese tributary system, at least as derived
largely from the Chinese example.21) In the first place, this has dangerous contemporary
implications, bestowing historical authenticity on Chinese claims to pre-eminence in South
East Asia by suggesting they involved onetime rights, for instance in Bangkok, comparable
with those that Bangkok enjoyed in Chiengmai.
But such a view is also erroneous. As Max Weber maintains,22) tributary-style relation-
ships of politIcal dependence were characteristic of the patrimonial regimes so common
throughout Asia, and it would have been strange indeed if South East Asian states had
not conformed in some fashion. Certainly the Chinese system would appear to have pos-
sessed a uniqueness in its elaboration and consistency when at its peak, vis-a-vis the Siamese
for instance, which was largely personal and non-bureaucratic,23) but this it did not reach
until the fifteenth century, under the Ming dynasty. The maritime South East Asian states,
as Professor Wolters has shown,24) had much earlier discovered the value of the south Chinese
markets for their produce, and paid irregular lipservice to the tributary system as it then
existed, mainly for the sake of the nominal equality it implied in their relations with each
other. But for the larger, agriculture-based states of Java and the Indo-Chinese peninsula,
their huge neighbour mattered little until the thirteenth century advent of the China-based
Mongols. It was only then, as a result of invasions of Yunnan, Burma, Champa and Java,
as well as Vietnam, accompanied by the seizure of political power by Thai immigrants over
much of modern Thailand and Burma, that South East Asia outside the Red River valley
recognized what could be thrown at it from the north. And it was this realization that
brought these states in spirit for the first time into the East Asian world.25)
Yunnan, in fact, was to remain an integral part of China, leaving the door open for
new attacks, and though the Mongols were repulsed on all other fronts by the end of the
thirteenth century, the succeeding Ming in their crisis of credibility demonstrated by Professor
Wang Gungwu,26) were to feel obliged to revive this expansionist policy in the early fifteenth.
That the Ming Emperor Yung-Io should even initially have despatched his vast war fleets
to South East Asian waters merely from commercial as opposed to prestige motives27) seems
hardly convincing when one remembers the Mongol Pamelayu precedent,28) and his con-
temporary warlike activities both in Central Asia and Vietnam. The naval expeditions,
lasting till 1435, were indeed his only real success, effectively, if briefly overawing into true
21) e.g. D. Chandler, op. cit., 153.
22) M. Weber, Economy and Society. 1968. III, 1051-2.
23) N. Jacobs, Modernization without Development: Thailand, an Asian Case Study. 1971. 27.
24) O. W. Wolters, Early Indonesian Commerce. 1967. 167.
25) G. Coedes, The fi£aking of South East Asia. 1966. Chapter IV.
26) Wang Gungwu, 'Early Ming relations with Southeast Asia: a background essay,' in J. K. Fairbank
ed., The Chinese World Order. 1968. 34-62.
27) As claimed principally by J. J. L. Duyvendak, 'The true dates of Chinese maritime expeditions in the
early fifteenth century.' T'oung Pao, XXXIV (1938), 341-412.
28) A maritime expedition launched in vain against the Majapahit Javanese state in 1292.
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suhmission rulers as far away as East Africa. On land, however, the Chinese armies were
thrown out of Vietnam by 1427, and then had to face a Mongol revival during the 1440's
which culminated in 1449 in the capture of Yung-Io's imperial successor himself. Ming
military prestige can never have been the same thereafter, and that it was now that the tri-
butary system as it affected South East Asia was finally perfected, indicates its true validity.
The theme that inspired it, te, the Emperor's supposed ineffable, incomparable excellence
that drew in emissaries from all sides to honour him, had been conceived originally in a
time of even greater weakness, the fifth and sixth centuries, and had consoled the Sung
rulers in the twelfth and thirteenth when themselves paying tribute to Mongoloid peoples
in Central Asia. The system had been regularized indeed by the Mongols, when they
obtained promises of triennial tribute as they withdrew in disorder from countries such
as Vietnam and Champa in the 1290's. And finally, it became again both cultural com-
pensation and face-saver for the Ming, and a veil behind which Sino-South East Asian
trade reached hitherto unprecedented proportions.29)
Thus, even in its theoretical sense, the Chinese tributary system was an empty sham,
though it was to survive through to the mid-nineteenth century with those South East Asian
rulers most interested in trade often attempting to send missions at more than the prescribed
triennial intervals.30) But there was much more to the failure of the system to repeat itself
in South East Asia than local perception of its lack of meaning. It was simply not a system
suitable for export, as the Vietnamese, the only people to attempt to employ it, proved.
It was a universal, exclusive system, which had to be unique. Its duplication by the
Vietnamese within South East Asia produced all sorts of problems of identity over and
above those within their highly sinicized society. They had at once, willy-nilly, to admit
of the ideological 'Elder Brother' status of the Chinese Emperor, but also suffered acute
embarrassment when Peking graded certain other South East Asian states as tributaries
senior to Vietnam, including some claimed by Vietnam as its own tributaries 131)
And besides, most of South East Asia had a much more suitable alternative model, that
of India. Political terminology in all major South East Asian languages except Vietnamese
and Tagalog, testifies, as in so many other fields of culture, to the dominating influence of
29) J. K. Fairbank & Ssu-yu Teng, "On the Ch'ing Tributary System," in HJAS (Harvard Journal of
Asiatic Studies) 6, 2: 135--246.
30) V. Purcell, The Chinese z"n Southeast Asz"a. 1966. 95-6, quoting the early nineteenth century British
emissary, John Crawfurd, on the Sino-Siamese relationship:" ... that the vessels which carry the ambassadors
may, under pretext of doing so, be exempted from the payment of imposts. With this view two of the
largest descriptions of junks, amounting to nearly one thousand tons each, sail annually from Bangkok to
Canton loaded with merchandize. They carry ambassadors annually to the Vice Roy of Canton and,
once in three years, these ambassadors go to Pekin ...They carry the Chinese Emperor a golden flower in
token of tribute, but receive in return gifts of a far greater value. The vanity of one court and the rapacity
of the other have long rendered this course a permanent one." There were also occasional, vain attempts
by the Manchus to intervene militarily-in Burma, 1662, and again in 1766-69, and in Vietnam, 1788,
but these represented nothing comparable with the Mongols or Ming.
31) A. B. Woodside, Vz'etnam and the Chinese Model. 1971. 235-243.
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India. And that this influence has survived to the present day indicates, no doubt, that
Indian political theory bore a much greater relevance than its Chinese counterpart for South
East Asian rulers; that the experiences and situation of the multiplicity of mediaeval Indian
states had much more in common with those of South East Asia than the great, unitary
Chinese Empire, even when the latter occasionally split three or four ways. Admittedly,
Indian political theory included the concept of the chakravartin, the 'universal ruler', but
even the great Mauryan Guptas had failed to establish the precedent of uniting all India,
and thus the concept had not necessarily to be restricted to anyone Indian state, or even
the Indian sub-continent. Like many Indian rulers, the sixteenth century Burmese king,
Tabinshwehti, aspired to the role as a justification for his ambitions of conquest.32)
But in practical terms also, the Indian model meant something very different from the
role of the Chinese Emperor. The extension of political authority could certainly be achieved
by force or any other means; cynical expediency was the hall-mark of mediaeval Indian
realpolitik apparently; but success was not then to be expressed in annexation, bureaucratic
centralization, and forcible acculturation.33) The Indian answer was a median way, between
the extremes of the reality of the Chinese tributary system on the one hand, and Chinese
ideal policy as applied where no effective obstacles stood in the way, on the other. In India,
wherever possible, defeated rulers, and especially those who offered homage voluntarily
rather than risk defeat, were to be left in possession of their principalities on condition of
paying tribute, providing levies in time of war, and other lesser duties. Even first-rank
Indian rulers continued to depend primarily on their own base locality for their strength,
and Indian political theory thus reflected their failure to establish a tradition of any more
than this.
From the South East Asian point of view, such theory was particularly appropriate.
States were sparsely populated, and demarcated by much clearer and more formidable
natural frontiers, mountain or sea, so that it provided a conceptualization and justification
of both the ruler's authority within the island or river-valley base area, and his occasional,
and generally vain attempts to combat geography and expand outside. One early state,
the great Khmer Empire of Cambodia, Angkor, enjoyed the opportunity to expand into
regions barred by no major physical obstacles, and occupied by no real rival political au-
thorities, but its transmission to its successor states, primarily Ayuthya, of some sense of
its centralizing aspirations, was accompanied by a knowledge of the limitations of even
its success.
What did all this mean for Thailand; and Ayuthya and Chiengmai in particular? For
lack of much pre-nineteenth century hard evidence we are on difficult ground. Certainly
the geographical and communications factor appears to have been quite as important here
as elsewhere in South East Asia. It seems largely to explain the failure of the fifteenth
32) E. Sarkisyanz, Buddhist Backgrounds of the Burmese Revolution. 1965. 93.
33) J. W. Spellman, The Political Thought of Ancient India. 1964. 146-169.
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and sixteenth century attempts of Ayuthya to conquer Chiengmai, although at that stage
the latter may well have enjoyed, through greater antiquity as a Thai state, stronger social
cohesiveness and political authenticity, while Ayuthya was still principally involved with
the absorption and Thaiization of large tracts of ex-Mon and Khmer territory. The latter
was a long drawn out process, perhaps nearing effective completion by the end of the sixteenth
century in the upsurge of enthusiasm which ejected the Burmese. By this time, probably
the whole of the compact Chaophraya plain could be regarded as the Siamese 'heartland',
and King Naresuan began, indeed, to look further afield.
But it was more than a century earlier, however, that King Trailokanat had issued his
famous Palatine Law (1468).34) This edict listed and classified provinces and claimed
dependencies and their duties, to which Siamese lawmakers forever harked back until the
nineteenth century, thereby enshrining a political balancing act which had soon lost much
of its relevance. Trailok had still been attempting both to placate and strengthen his au-
thority over what had been, until shortly before, important tributary states in the Chaophraya
valley itself. At that time, those beyond, at any rate to the north, represented mere aspira-
tions.35) Naresuan's seventeenth century successors, however, might have been expected
to build further on the work of their predecessors and Ayuthya's particularly fortunate
strategic position, by expanding into the natural buffer regions that surrounded so much
of the country's heartland--Western Laos, the whole of the Mekhong valley from Luang
Phrabang to Cambodia, the northern Malay states, and even south-east Burma, as yet still
primarily Mon and un-Burmanized. Yet so little was done, seemingly, that relations with
tributaries, albeit perhaps a topic outside the specific scope, for instance, of Miss Busakorn's
thesis,36) do not even force their way in to any extent as might have been expected. Palace
struggles, no doubt largely prompted by the lucrativeness of the capital city's developing
foreign trade, and complications with Western powers were all-preoccupying, to be supersed-
ed in the eighteenth century by Vietnamese south-westward expansion into Cambodia,
provoking a number of desultory Siamese counter-invasions with little long-term result.
Elsewhere, Chiengmai's 1663 rejection of Siamese suzerainty was accepted, Khorat was
refortified during the reign of Narai (1657-88),37) but penetration of the plateau beyond was
slow, despite the disintegration of the old Vientiane Lanchang kingdom, and mainly by
settlement and cultural influence as in the South, where another recent work has emphasized
how weak had actual Siamese authority become.3S) The Court continued to receive oc-
casional offers of allegiance and the attendant obligations as provided for by the Palatine
Law, but successive Siamese kings, for lack of manpower, were simply not in a position
34) H. Q. Quaritch Wales, Ancient .Siamese Government and Administration. 1965. Chapter V.
35) W. A. R. Wood, History of Siam. 1959. 86.
36) Busakorn Lailert, op. cit.
37) Manit Vallibhotama, Guide to Pimai. 1962. 17-18.
38) A. Teeuw & D. K. Wyatt, Hikayat Patani. 1970. I, 21.
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to fulfil the implicit corollary duty of protection.39) The dynasty was facing a crisis of au-
thority in Siam Proper even, heralded back in the seventeenth century when the omnibus
regional ministries began to emerge as a form of power balance,40) while major new dis-
ruptive forces were massing on the frontiers. 41) Only in the course of the overturning of all
traditional authority right across mainland South East Asia in the middle of the eighteenth
century, was the Siamese ruling elite sufficiently transformed and galvanized into mounting
a more positive, active border policy.
Thus, a study of previous centuries, while highlighting the general importance of prag-
matism and conservatism in Thai political tradition, seems of little help in explaining the
exact form that the Bangkok-Chiengmai relationship was now to take. Indeed, a stable
peacetime relationship was only to develop after 1810, and the final fading out of the Burmo-
Siamese wars. The intervening period served principally to emphasize the buffer role of
the Western Lao tributaries, and thereby the imperativeness of allowing the local rulers a
great deal of room for initiative. Initially, the opposite extreme of policy was employed
by King Taksin, for good enough specifically local reasons; the leading Chiengmai noble
who had been recognized as Prince of the town in 1774, experienced difficulty in establishing
his authority, and all the more so when a new Burmese attack in 1775 drove him to abandon
his capital (--it remained empty for twenty years), and take refuge further south. But
Taksin's response, the arrangement through his Minister of the North (Chakrz}, and the
latter's brother, Surasih, for a group of Siamese taxation officers to make an inspection
tour of the Lao states42) suggests something more, the sort of expansive aspirations that
did tend regularly to well up, as we have seen, at times of revival and renewal in Siam.
Perhaps Taksin even believed that the recent disasters suffered by the Siamese kingdom had
stemmed in large measure from the ineffectiveness of pre-1767 tributary relationships; for
example, the failure of those in the south to delay the Burmese advance long, or provide
much aid.
Taksin's policy, at any rate, promised disaster. Kawila, the eldest of the seven sons
of the Prince of Lampang, and ruling the town in his father's name, drove the King's in-
spectors from his state by force, and then, like the Prince of Chiengmai, refused for a couple
of years to report in person at Thonburi. Ultimately, aware perhaps of the all-conquering
progress of the Siamese armies up the Mekhong valley, both did so, and were imprisoned,
the Chiengmai Prince dying in captivity. Kawila suffered the humiliating punishment
of having his ears slit, but was quite soon freed to return to his state to continue the fight
against the Burmese. It is interesting to speculate as to the reason for Taksin's so relenting.
Undoubtedly, for lack of local leadership, Western Laos would have lain open for the Burmese
39) Akin Rabibhadana, op. cit., 37.
40) D. K. Wyatt in D. J. Steinberg ed., In Search of Southeast Asia. 1971. 63, and Busakorn, op. cit., 240.
41) N. J. Brailey, "A Re-investigation of the Gwe of Eighteenth Century Burma," in JSEAS (Journal of
South East Asian Studies) II. 2 (1971), 33-47.
42) Prachakitkorachak, Phongsawadan Yonok. 483.
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taking, but perhaps Kawila had already gained the goodwill of the Chakri and his brother,
who became King Rama I and Uparat (Deputy King) respectively in 1782, when Taksin
was deposed. Certainly, the new King made no attempt to resume his predecessor's policy
in the north, and turned back to a more moderate approach in his dealings with the Western
Lao as appears to have been his general tendency in most fields of affairs. The Dparat
took Kawila's sister to wife as his Chief Queen, and thereafter Kawila was built up into
a viceroy of Western Laos, being given the responsibility to resettle Chiengmai, and after
its successful establishment and defence against the last major Burmese attack in 1799,
was promoted Phrachao Prathetsarat, or 'dependent king' .43) This rank placed him on
a par with the rulers of VientIane and Cambodia, and on his visits to Rama 1's new capital,
Bangkok, with the King's six senior ministers, the Senabodi.
There are ostensibly particular parallels between Chiengmai and Vientiane, which was
placed under direct Siamese military rule in 1779, but where, later, Chao Anu was similarly
built up into a viceroy of the North-east.44) Yet generally there appears little real con-
sistency in Siamese policy towards its tributaries even in these years. In Cambodia and
the South Taksin left things largely as they were; in Nakhon Sithammarat indeed, it was he
who set about building the local governor up to viceroy status, while it was Rama I who
in turn demoted the same governor, and balanced his authority with that of the rising Chinese
immigrant governing famIly of Songkhla.45) Rama I also detached a number of western
Cambodian provinces in 1795, and placed them under the separate administration of the
especially trustworthy Battambang noble family, an action which probably contributed
to tne subsequent attempts of the King of Cambodia to revive his tributary dependence
on rival Vietnam.46) Even in Eastern Laos in the 1790's, Rama I was concerned to foil
Vientiane's efforts to dominate neighbouring Luang Phrabang. Chao Anu's rise dates
more properly from the next reign, that of Rama II (1809-24), and follows an 1807-8 episode
in Western Laos that should have thrown a great deal of doubt on the wisdom of a 'viceroy'
policy.47) Burmese emissaries brought to Bangkok what they claimed was evidence of
Phrachao Kawila's approaches to the Court of Ava to establish some sort of Burma-Chiengmai
relationship. The expose suggests that the negotiations fell through, and thus the Siamese
would have seen no need for action. But these seems good reason to believe that the ap-
proaches were made, reflecting Lao feeling that Siamese influence was excessive or un-
friendly,48) and failing perhaps because of a renewed Burmese refusal to allow Chiengmai
43) Ibid., 502. King Chulalongkom himself employed this English term to C;'eneral Sir Andrew Clarke,
10th August 1877. F.O. (Foreign Office Archives) 69/67.
44) K. Wenk, The Restoration of Siam under Rama I. 1968.99, and D. K. Wyatt, "Siam and Laos, 1767-
1824," JSEAH (Joumal of South-East Asian History) IV. 2. (1963), 19-47.
45) Wenk, op. ct't., 103.
46) Chandler in Steinberg ed., op. ct't., 119.
47) Wenk, op. cit., 91-94.
48) The Lao envoy handed over by the Burmese specifically linked his mission with the death of Kawila's
brotherin-law, the Uparat Surasih, back in 1803.
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'two-headed bird' status. Significantly, Kawila's successors were not permitted by the
Siamese to inherit his complete pre-eminence.
So far as general Siamese tributary policy is concerned, it seems reasonable to conclude
that it had become much more active than in later Ayuthya days, the primary policy-de-
termining factors being the personality and loyalty of the respective dependent rulers, and
the nature of the threats from beyond. Kawila and Anu were backed because, though
'strong men', they were originally regarded as unusually loyal, and because the reigns of
each coincided with periods of particular danger from the North-west, i.e. Burma, and then
the East, Vietnam. Similarly, a subsequent Governor of N akhon, Chaophra)la Noi, achieved
great prominence in the peninsula once again after 1810, as Bangkok became increasingly
aware of the growing British presence in the Straits of Malacca.49) He too was a man
in whom the Siamese placed great trust. But when such threats diminished, or such loyalty
became doubtful, Siamese backing would be withdrawn. The ultimate deterrent was
employed in Vientiane following Anu's rebellion of 1826-7. There, Bangkok felt forced
finally to abolish the state, simultaneously offering a warning to any other similarly inclined
dependencies. In Cambodia, exceptionally, the local rulers were never sufficiently loyal
because of the counter opportunities for Vietnamese support, and thus the alternative ex-
pedient was adopted by the Siamese of creating a rival Cambodian dependency along the
Western borders of the country.
The above discussion has been concerned with a period for which we have only scanty
evidence, and most of this is in Siamese, and therefore Ayuthya or Bangkok-oriented. One
of the advantages of concentratIOn on the Bangkok-Chiengmai relationship is that, in the
period after 1810, a comparative wealth of evidence develops, much of it in the form of re-
ports by Western visitors of what the Lao locals thought, or claimed to think. As has been
suggested above, one should beware of concepts such as the 'typical' tributary relationship.
Western Laos during this period was seemingly the quietest and most stable of Siam's frontier
areas, and all the more emphatically so after Burma's defeat by Britain in the war of 1824-6,
although Bangkok was probably worried by the British presence and certainly continued
to show apprehension of Burmese ambitions as late as the 1840's. The government may
even have been encouraged in both fears by the Lao Princes, but nevertheless conditions
were undeniably at their most favourable for Siamese interests.
Miss Wilson in her thesis, referring to the 1810-50 period or the couple of decades that
followed it, talks much in terms of Bangkok 'control' policies with regard to its tributaries.
She lists a considerable number of ways in which 'control' was exerted; namely, the re-
cruitment of dependent rulers' sons as Mahatlek, or Royal Pages, and daughters as wives
or ladies-in-waitmg to the King or members of the Royal Family, appointive powers and
49) W. F. Vella, Siam under Rama Ill. 61. lIe of course was regarded throughout as a Siamese official
rather than a dependent prince, as also even was Ahmad, Malay Sultan of Kedah (1803-50?), similarly
given the 'official' title of Chaophraya. cf. Bonney, Kedah. 121, fn. 94.
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rewards, sakun, or the exploitation of family rivalries, and judicial authority, all in the ab-
sence of any regular bureaucracy at this time. She scarcely bothers, indeed, to distinguish
between the prathetsarat dependencies and the huamuang, or provinces of Siam Proper, for
she asserts that Siamese concern being greatest regarding the border prathetsarat, therefore
Siamese 'control' was also greatest there, and denies, in the process, the hitherto generally
accepted theory that the authority of pre-modern South East Asian rulers declined in reverse
proportion to the distance from the capital city.50)
This approach reflects, it seems to me, the Bangkok materials it was primarily based
upon. As Jacobs declares, "even at the cyclical nadir, the center's claim to total authority
over the periphery was never relinquished. 51 ) Miss Wilson herself demonstrates the con-
siderable degree of control the captital possessed in its immediately neighbouring rural
areas.52) But in terms of Western Laos, even in this period, 'influence', or occasionally
'authority' would seem to be much more valid terms with which to characterize Siamese
policy. The presence of relatives of the Lao Princes in Bangkok must, indeed, have been
some sort of deterrent to any anti-Bangkok activity by them, but specific examples of such
exiles do not appear to have been very common. We have far more cases of Lao Chao, or
members of the local ruling elites, exiled in Bangkok at the request of a state Prince, following
their defeat in some succession or other squabble. And at least one Eastern Lao rebellion
rather later on was actually provoked by the removal of a Prince's sons to Bangkok.53)
Miss WIlson similarly emphasizes the importance of Bangkok's powers of appointment
and reward.54) But King Mongkut's Pllrakhlang, or Foreign Minister, Chaophraya
Thiphakorawong (Kham Bunnag), admitted that the succession in "'~estern Laos was elective
locally,55) and it was Mongkut himself (ruled 1851-68), apparently, who was behind the
Bangkok Recorder article of 1866,56) which defined very clearly the limited extent of Siamese
participation in the process. The Siamese kings possessed a theoretical power of veto,
exercisable when the Lao Princes presented themselves, ma fao, for investiture in Bangkok,
but there is no recorded instance of their ever doing so in this period so far as Western Laos
is concerned. On the other hand, there are apparent examples of Siamese desires being
overridden; for example, the succession dispute of 1855-6 at Chiengmai:57) On the whole,
the Siamese Government avoided obvious committment to any candidate if it was not already
clear which had majority support locally. And it reflects a Bangkok-centricity that even
the Siamese themselves rarely showed, to believe that the Lao so valued the titles and presents
Bangkok showered on them thatt hey allowed themselves to be seriously influenced with regard
50) C. Wilson, oj). ,it.} 513, 520, 701.
51) Jacobs, op. cit., 57. italics added.
52) C. Wilson, op. cit.} 691-92.
53) Bunnag, op. dt.} 123.
54) Wilson, op. at.} 513-9.
55) Snidvongs, op. cit.} 237-8.
56) 3rd May 1866.
57) ChaRyi to Plzraya of Chiengrai, 10th November 1856. NL (Thai National Library MSS) 1218/13.
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either to appointments or policy. At root, even at the turn of the century,58) the Lao con-
sidered the Siamese, or 'Thai Noi' ('Little Thai') as they called them, an inferior race in-
dividually, as much as the Siamese did the Lao.
The exploitation of family rivalries is self-evidently a devious means of 'influence' as
opposed to 'control' or direction. With the senior offices in all the Western Lao states dis-
tributed amongst rival families, even though those of Chiengmai, Lampang and Lamphun
were derived from a common ancestor, opportunities for such exploitation might have been
expected to have been frequent. It is all the more remarkable and significant, therefore, that
a tradition of Lao 'strong-men' developed, with, after a short interregnum on the death
of Kawila, the successive eras of Mahawong, Uparat} Phraya and Phrachao at Chiengmai,
1826- 56, and thereafter Kawila's son, Kawilorot, Phraya and Phrachao at Chiengmai, 1856--
70. The Siamese were indeed able to prevent either from assuming quite the dominating
role of Kawila right across Vlestern Laos, but the pre-eminence of both is undeniable.59)
The role of a third individual, Bunthawong, Uparat of Chiengmal 1870-82, was complicated
by the international problems I shall be discussing below, and limited by his premature death.
Miss Wilson's case appears weakest of all in connection with the question of Siamese
judicial authority in Western Laos, and the use of the dika and klao thot forms of petition.
She admits herself the survival of very few Fourth Reign (Mongkut) references to petitions
complaining of official behaviour, even in Siam Proper.60) Those cases she does adduce,
however, seem invariably to indicate the reluctance of King or Ministers to follow them up,
particularly in the more distant provinces. Of the two deriving from Western Laos, that
of 1848 against the Prince of Lampang, which resulted in his replacement, merely reflected
and reinforced the domination of his rival, Mahawong of Chiengmai, while that against
Kawilorot in 1866 actually rebounded to the accused Prince's advantage. Here, the charge
brought by several of the Prince's alienated subordinates, was the very serious one of con-
spiracy with the Burmese. The evidence of doubtful dealings, involving even Lao gifts
of elephants to the other side, was conclusive. Seemingly, however, Kawilorot convinced
the King's chief minister, Chaophraya Si Suriyawong (Chuang Bunnag), that he had not
planned actual withdrawal of his allegiance, the King himself was overruled, the petitioners
were all exiled in Bangkok, and the Prince returned home in triumph.61)
One other highly significant issue develops from Miss Wilson's specific denial of any
great distinction between prathetsarat and 'outer provinces' in their relations with Bangkok.
Another author, N. Jacobs, maintains that while governors of even the remotest provinces
merely "strove to establish small-scale reproductions of this primary [Bangkok] system
of patrimonial relationship rather than to legitimize formally local political rights within the
58) Vice-Consul Lyle to Black, 1st May 1900, F.O. 628/267, or to Beckett, 14th August 1902, F.O. 628/279.
59) Rev. D. McGilvary to Rev. Irving, 3rd March 1868. No. 72 in PMSL (U.S. Presbyterian Mission,
Siam Letters) III.
60) Wilson, op. c£t.} 498-503.
61) Maha Ammat, Phongsawadan Ch£engmaz·, 115-6.
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larger system", in the 'tnbutary zone', from the Siamese point of view, "it was a choice
of center recognition or no political presence at all. "62) Both authors thus seem here to
dispute the conventional view of gradually reduced central authority the further from the
Siamese capital. But while Wilson claims greatest Siamese authority throughout the outer
provinces and dependencies equally, Jacobs seems to emphasize central authority over the
outer provinces vis-a-vis the dependencies. Each thus begs the question of the conversion
of dependencies into provinces, which undoubtedly happened in pre-modern and modernizing
Siam as a measure of growing Siamese authority in the border regions, and the tieing-in
of their local hierarchies with the central one in Bangkok.
A case in point is that of Tak, or Raheng, on the edge of the Chaophraya plain, south
of Chiengmai. Its eighteenth century allegiance must be a matter of doubt.63) There
seems no evidence of any actual personal connection between the future King Taksin and
the town of which he was supposed to be governor in the last days of Ayuthya. A Western
map printed in the 1840's shows a major earthwork running east-west to the south of the
town, supposedly marking the Lao frontier with Siam Proper,64) and there is no doubt that
it was generally known by its Lao name, Raheng, and remained preponderantly Lao in
population until the second half of the nineteenth century.6.5) Indeed, it formed a constituent
part of Kawila's viceroyalty, and continued to be ruled by chiefs of local origin for decades
after his death.66) By 1866, however, it had become the only 'outer province' the then
Minister of the North was prepared to admit to in the northern part of the Chaophraya
plain.67) It still nevertheless paid tribute,68) rather than offering allegiance through the
more abject water-oath ceremony of the inner provinces, and while the latter had their of-
ficials appointed direct from Bangkok and applied standard Siamese taxes and corvees,
62) Jacobs, op. cit., 27, 57.
63) M. Vickery ("Thai Regional Elites and the Reforms of King Chulalongkorn," Journal of Asian Studies
XXIX, 4, 868) quotes La Loubere's Kingdom of Siam on the status of a late seventeenth century ruler of
the town as an 'hereditary lord' and vassal to the King of Siam.
64) With D. Richardson, "Journal of a Mission from the Supreme Government of India to the Court of
Siam," Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal, IX (1840).
65) D. McGilvary in Bangkok Calendar, 1868, SO, or to Rev. D. Irving, 11th June 1880, in PMSL IV, 71.
66) Notton, Chronique de Xiengmai. 217, and Report of a Talien (Mon) Myothugyi, 3rd August 1831. BSP
(Bengal Secret Proceedings) vol. 362.
67) Chaophrava Phutharaphai to Consul T. G. Knox, 15th February 1866. 1".0. 628/4/56. There seems
still to be much disagreement on Siamese methods of provincial anel/or tributary classification. Wilson
(847, Table F2) notes two parallel systems. one of four numerical classes, the other of Inner and Outer
huamuang (towns or provinces) except in the lIIahatthai region where, in the 1860's at least, there were
Inner, Middle and Outer huamuang. The last numbered eight, and included Raheng, while the de-
pendencies formed a quite separate classification.
Bunnag (31-32), following Prince Damrong, combines Miss Wilson's two systems in a sense,
claiming a basic system of inner provinces, outer provinces, and dependencies, the first subdivided into
the four numerical classes. Here, the outer provinces are described as a late eighteenth century, and by
no means widerspread innovation. Akin (69) gives an alternative combination, ascribing the numerical
Fourth Class denomination to all Inner huamuang, and First, Second and Third to the Outer huamuang.
68) In money, though. Bunnag, of. ct"t., 3:3.
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the Minister asserted his obligation to appoint most of Tak's governors and junior officials
from local families and respect local customs. By this time, the town was swelling with
immigrants from all over Burma and Siam, drawn by trade opportunities and the developing
teak industry. Yet there can be little doubt that the town's period of association with Western
Laos, and its surviving degree of autonomy and Lao identity had a lot to do with the problems
of 'control' Bangkok faced in Tak in the 1860's and 1870's, when, for a time, the officials
of the town themselves enjoyed a reputation unequalled in Northern Siam for thuggery and
misrule, preying on the trade that had turned it into the largest commercial centre north
of Bangkok.69)
Bangkok interference in Tak was, indeed, to serve warning of similar action in Western
Laos and other dependencies. Thus, the question of whether it should be classified as
part of the administrative modernization of Siam, or a hangover from pre-modern Siamese
centralizing ambitions is quite as relivant as the classification of the intervention in Western
Laos. In fact, the evidence appears too scanty to come to any firm conclusion, but it would
seem something of a transitional case, its origins probably dating back before the 1850's,
generally recognized as the first really critical period of modernWestern pressure on Siam)
but its climax not really coming till the 1880's, and the experience gained here ultimately
contributing to the character of administrative centralization as applied even to Siam Proper
m the years after 1892.
In the meanwhile, however, such policies were to be applied to Western Laos and other
dependencies, and their situation differed in important respects from that of Tak in the mid-
nineteenth century. Given that the Lao rulers were loc~lly chosen, ran their own judicial
and financial systems, and patronized a separate local monkhood, and against the background
of their historic tradItions of independence, it seems a more useful approach to concentrate
rather on what had become customary limitations on their sovereignty. Those of a cere-
momal character clearly had their importance; the delaying of the cremation of a deceased
senior Chao until the arrival of a Siamese official representative, the use of Siamese regalia
(khruangyot), bestowed on mdividual Chao when they presented themselves for investiture
in the Siamese capital, and the practice of offering to the Siamese Kings locally discovered
attributes of royalty, such as unusual animals, particularly the so-called 'white elephants'.
Of greater practical significance, in terms of its effect on local Lao economies, was tribute,
generally paid triennially.70) The symbolic gold and silver trees contained, in fact, a con-
siderable weight of precious metal,71) but even more burdensome, probably, were the local
69) Satow's Chiengmai Journal, 22nd February 1886. P.R.O. (British Public Record Office Archives)
30/33/20/1.
70) As part of the Chiengmai political settlement of 1856, Bangkok attempted to extort a promise of annual
tribute, but the triennial basis seems to have been reverted to within a couple of years. Chakri to Chao
of Chiengmai, 10th November 1856, and date not given, 1858/9. NL 1218/13 and 1220/37.
71) C. Bock, Temples and Elephants. 1884. 156, estimated the value of a gold tree in 1880 at about £135.
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product requirements, mostly paid in teak-wood by the Western Lao states.72) All this implied
a great deal more than the Chinese tributary system, and yet they were concessions, made
by the Lao states as political entities quite separate from Siam, and not even in the field of
foreign relations during this period did they operate as true protectorates. Bangkok spe-
cifically recognized their right to make what virtually amounted to treaties with the British
Burmese authorities in respect of border demarcation and trade.73) And that they maintained
links with Siam's old enemy, Burma, the Lao did not flaunt before even British visitors,
let alone the Siamese themselves; they had no wish to endanger the 'face' of the latter, as
in 1808; but that the Siamese should hear mere rumours of such did no harm at all. That
the Siamese remained on tenterhooks about the loyalty of the Western Lao states, and were
therefore very tentative in their treatment of them, is attested to by various \\Testern visitors. 74)
Thus, having originated from the Lao point of view in a choice of two evils, of the least
overbearing of two powerful neighbours, with the local growth in population, and the develop-
ment of alternative trade connections with Yunnan and British Burma,75) the tributary
relationship with Bangkok seems to have survived up to 1850 largely on the basis of lengthen-
ing tradition, and on the continuing reputation for non-interference of the Siamese. From
the Siamese point of view, at the very least an active policy would have involved the serious
communications problem, contravening the anti-annexationist Indian-derived traditions
described above, and a great deal of personal inconvenience for many members of the Siamese
elite. Bangkok was their world, and they had no wish for exile to distant provinces and
tributaries, in their eyes barbarian lands, of little interest in themselves, which merely served
to set off the magnificence of Court life and insulate it against attack from beyond. It is
only during the reign of Mongkut that there are signs of more positive policies developing,
more pronounced in other border areas than Western Laos perhaps, but to reach a real
fruition in Western Laos in the 1870's and 1880's. Why and how, then, did Siamese policy
alter from one of influence to one of direction, and the relationship from a balance of interests
to one representing primarily those of Bangkok?
There can be little doubt that nearly all significant change that has occurred in Siam
or Thailand since the mid-nineteenth century, has been directly or indirectly Western-
provoked. This is not to deny that Thai culture and society had been developing all through
the centuries, but the quality of change over the last century has been very different. Nor
is this surprising, in view of the quite unprecedented threat presented by the West, and the
long and general South East Asian tradition of absorbing influences from outside rather
72) Usually despatched every year or two--some 250 trees back in the 1830's according to the Journal of
Captain McLeod, Parliamentary Accounts and Papers, C, vol. 50 (1867). 38-9.
73) Chakri to Phraya of Chiengmai, 22nd September 1845. NL 1207/45, and Commr. Colvin to Bushby,
19th July 1847. India Secret Proceedings, vol. 138.
74) Henry Burney in the Burney Papers I, pt. 1,83-4; Journal of Captain McLeod, 33, M. Grandjean in
Chinese Repository XVI, 335-346, and Journals of Dr. Richardson (British Museum MS. 30354), f. 152-3.
75) Both prompted apparently by Lao initiatives in the 1820's-d. Journal of Captain McLeod, 32 and fn.,
and Journals of Dr. Richardson, f. 3.
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then propagating abroad local innovations. And in determining whether Siamese policies
of administrative centralization were modern or pre-modern, what is important is not neces-
sarily simply the outward forms they took; the Japanese 'Meiji Restoration' misnomer is
surely evidence enough of that; but the reasons for them, so far as they can be assessed in
particular cases. So far as the Western Laos case is concerned, the West, and principally
Britain was clearly at the bottom of it all.
The story of the extension of British interest to mainland South East Asia is perhaps
well enough known, and only its specific relevance for Thailand will be discussed here. It
first became evident in territorial terms as early as 1786, when the East India Company
purchased the island of Penang from the Sultan of Kedah. At that time, the newly established
Chakri dynasty's authority over the North Malay dependencies was weak and threatened
by Burma, and it was not until 1818, when Bangkok required Kedah to invade and subject
its southern neighbour, Perak, to Siamese suzerainty, that thIS Siamese expansionism caused
Anglo-Siamese relations to become an issue. When, in 182L supposedly suspecting Burmese
intrigue in the area, the Siamese sent forces into Kedah to seize the Sultan, the British on
Penang, to whom the Sultan fled for refuge, recommended opening direct negotiations with
Bangkok. In response, the Government of India despatched John Crawfurd to the Siamese
capital where, although he failed to persuade the Siamese to compromise with their erstwhile
dependent, or open up their country to trade with the West, he probably helped to make them
as aware of Western strength as he did the East India Company of the weakness of Siam.76)
Yet fortunately, while the Crawfurd mission stimulated a mild interest in the possibIlities
of trade with Siam among the business communities of the Straits Settlements (now including
Singapore and Malacca along with Penang), the political interests of the two governments
now became paramount and coincident. From the time Burmese activities on the Bengal
frontier first forced the reluctant British Indian Government into war with Ava in 1824,
until the 1870's, it was Calcutta's apparent policy to avoid further complications with Bangkok.
The principal purpose of the despatch of the second British envoy to Siam, Captain Henry
Burney in 1825, was to ensure Siamese neutrality during the First Anglo-Burmese War, and
Burney even tried to obtain Siamese aid against Burma in return for the cession of the
Burmese province of Tenasserim. The Siamese, probably not yet convinced that the Bntish
were in South East Asia to stay, exhibited a cautious determination to remain neutral, and
proved willing to accept only a very ambiguous division of interests in Northern Malaya
and a very limited trade agreement. The only aspect of Anglo-Siamese relations which
seemingly concerned Calcutta seriously during the next two decades, was the cattle and
teak trade between Siam's Western Lao dependencies and the port of Moulmein, on which
the solvency of the province of Tenasserim, annexed to the Indian Empire in 1826, largely
depended. In this field, significantly, the Indian Government discovered that Bangkok
had little influence, when a temporary intermission in the trade prompted the sending to
76) Vella, Siam under Rama llI. 63, 115-7.
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Bangkok of a third British emissary, Dr. Richardson, in 1839.77)
Simultaneously, it was becoming evident to the Siamese that the East India Company
was not prepared to support the commercial interests of the Straits Settlements with force,
and they began quietly to ignore the Burney trade agreement provisions. Led by the King
himself, Rama III, many of the senior officials carried on the traditions of their Chinese~
Indian, or Persian merchant forbears, by extending their own trading activities to the British
colonies of Singapore and (from 1840) Hong Kong, and the Chinese coastal ports. In the
process, a considerable realignment of power within the Siamese kingdom took place, with
the emphasis switching from the interior to the coastal provinces. No longer did the com-
paratively vast but not easily wielded manpower owing loyalty to successive holders of the
post of Chakyi, or Minister of the North, count for so much. The officials with mterests
in the formerly more thinly-populated coastal provinces now78) commanded the most lucrative
sources of income and the more elahorate mini-bureaucracies to administer them, and one
family in particular, the Bunnags, seems practically to have scooped this new pool of influence
to become dominant in Siamese politics. One member of the family, Dit, controlled sim-
ultaneously from 1830-51, both the Ministries most concerned with the outside world, the
Kalahom and the Phrakhlang.79 ) Thus, it was his relatives and supporters, the latter in-
cluding both Mongkut and Itsaret, the next King and Second King-to-be, who became most
knowledgeable about the West, and best qualified to deal practically and realistically with
the problems it was about to present to Siam.
The most significant characteristic of the new Western, still mainly British initiative,
when it came in the early 1850's, was that it was prompted by the now preponderant, London-
backed private commercial interests in face of strong opposition from the Indian subcontinent-
oriented East India Company. Thus, even in the aftermath of the Second Anglo-Burmese
War (1852-3) and the resulting extension of the Anglo-Siamese frontier, its effect, through
the treaty arranged by Sir John Bowring on Britain's behalf in 1855, was rather to break the
remarkable monopolistic control of the Siamese elite over the country's foreign trade, but
hardly to touch territorial questions or political matters. It did not result in any very re-
markable increase in the Western presence, while the abolition of the East India Company
in 1857, and the establishment of the India Office in its place, apparently restored the influence
of specifically Indian interests in Home Government counsels. As long as Anglo-Siamese
trade expanded steadily, as it was to do in the years after 1855, very little British pressure
77) Ibid.} 117-121, Richardson's 1839 Journal in ISP vol. 26, and Commr. Blundell to Bushby, 20th October
1842. ISP vol. 87.
78) To some extent this was perhaps a renewal of the seventeenth century situation, the pre-exclusion era of
commercial activity.
79) These were two of the six Senabodi-headed 'ministries', responsible respectively for War and the Treasury
according to the Palatine Law. The Kalahom, in practice, was more specifically the Ministry for the
Southern Provinces, while the Phrakhlang administered those around the capital and the Bight of Bangkok.
The ll1'ahatthai, Ministry of the North, was the third of the so-called 'omnibus' ministries.
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was to be exerted on the Siamese in other fields. 80)
In fact, there can be no question that the first clear challenge to Siam's territorial integrity,
and thus her existmg unbureaucratic governmental system, came from France. Their late
seventeenth century escapade aimed at the take-over of the government of the country, and
not forgotten by the Siamese, gave the French a special sentimental interest in Siam.
However, their initial nineteenth century activIty was concentrated further east. Fifteen
months before they obtained the cession of their first three Vietnamese provinces in mid-1862,
they had begun to make overtures to the King of CambodIa whose country was prostrated
by civil war. The apprehensive Siamese refrained from any overt action in support of their
own claims, and within three years, the French had converted the rival Vietnamese claim
into effective control in their own name. Later, in 1867, fearful of the spread of French
interest to Eastern Laos, King Mongkut agreed to abandon all Siamese rights over Cambodia
in return for the cession of two Cambodian provinces. This battle was thus lost long before
the Si!1mese could devise any real administrative innovation to strengthen their suzerainty,
and nor was any to stem directly from this 10ss.81)
Elsewhere, according to Mongkut himself, French interests were secretly involved in
the Kra isthmus canal scheme during the early 1860's,82) while in 1865, three Frenchmen
suddenly requested passes to buy timber in Northern Siam.83) The Lagn§e-Garnier expe-
dition up the Makhong valley in 1866-7 proved the poor navigational value of that waterway,
but other French agents penetrated the Shan States from Upper Burma in the early 1870's,84)
and in 1873-4, Garnier's ill-fated attempt to occupy Hanoi was exploited by the French
colonial authorities to establish a permanent presence in independent Vietnam, not so far
from Siam's Eastern Lao dependencies. Even King Mongkut's trip to view the solar eclipse
at Hua Whan in 1868, where he caught his fatal illness, was apparently mainly prompted by
the fear that a French party which had previously requested permission to do the same,
independently, would then establish Itself permanently on the peninsula.85)
Of course, if the French seemed to be everywhere, British commercial interests were
not idle during this period either, around Siam's vulnerable periphery. For a time, trade
with Cambodia aroused their enthusiasn, as did also the Kra scheme. During the 1860's,
British officials in Burma again questioned Siamese suzerainty over Western Laos,86) while,
in 1862, Governor Cavenagh of Singapore sent warships to hombard Trengganu on the east
coast of the Malay Peninsula to prevent the entrenchment of Siamese authority in the area.
80) J. C. Ingram, Economic Chan,lfe in Thailand since 1850. 1955 esp. 33-5, and Brailey, Origins of the
Siamese Forward Movement ... 90-95.
81) P. Duke, Les Relations entre la .France et la Thailande. Bangkok, 1962. Chapters I-II.
82) Mongkut to Knox, 23rd December 1866. F.O. 69/40.
83) Phraya Maha Ammat circular, 26th July 1865. NL 1227/92.
84) British Resident, Mandalay, to Secretary Duncan, 10th October 1874. IFP(India Foreign and Political),
vol. 773.
85) Acting Consul Alabaster to Lt. Col. Ryan. 16th June 1868 in F.O. 628/5/66.
86) Moulmein Commr. Fytche to Chief Commr. Phayre, 3rd September 1863, IFF. vol. 71.
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Yet, in the Jate 1860's, Governor Ord publicly reversed his predecessor's policy, while the
British Consulate in Bangkok apparently connived at Siamese exclusion of British commercial
interests from the Lao dependencies.87) The prime difference between France and England
lay probably in the fact that, while the governments of both countries were generally averse
to the imperial adventures urged on them by their local representatives and commercial and
other interests, French governments lacked the authority of their British counterparts, were
thus often involved involuntarily in such adventures, and rendered incapable of extricating
themselves except at the expense of much prestige. There was not the same separation of
personnel as between the British Foreign Service and Indian Political Branch, various French
diplomats in Bangkok being recruited from, or subsequently joining their Colonial Service.
And they were also, earlier, more conscious of their 'mIssion civilisatrice'. Thus, it was
undoubtedly they the Siamese initially feared most. King Mongkut perhaps truly believed
that Britain was conniving at French expansion when he wrote to his Consul in Rangoon
III 1865,
I beg to know from your information of fact how far or how extensive the French
influence on this powerless land of Cochin China, Cambodia, Laos and Siam was, or has
been agreed by her European alliance.
British nation here-[Is?] Her Majesty's Government pleased to have French colony
connected with province of Tenasserim of British Burmah.88)
and later to the British Consul in Bangkok, Thomas Knox,
I am of opinion that we are very powerless and orphans when the French do such
indirect steps toward us without shame. We cannot resist or defend ourselves unless
another power would favour us by reasonable merciful assistance ...
I beg to say unto you myself alone without the knowledge of our Government that
if now any professing of being under the kind protectorate of Her Britannic Majesty
be necessary, I will fully subscribe myself and my family to be so. Why have I said
so? To cause you to be glad? O! No! I say truly Her Britannic Majesty's ancestors
were in Royalty before mine several years and her royal generations continued peacefull
for the last many years without change. Which the grand Napoleon Buonaparte has
claimed his sovereignty 14 years after my grandfather and revolutIOns took place in
France subsequently. I cannot be glad to take refuge or devote myself to the French
like the King of Cambodia without shame.
How should I have any piece of ground of suitable climate in British territories at
either British Burmah or Pinang or Ceylon to be purchased for building, cultivation
& c. like a piece of ground in England purchased by the old French King Louis Philippe
late in his reign? I wish this for my residence in very old age or for my feeble successors
in future, if this land or region of Chin India beyond British Burmah were allowed for
influences to be made a vast colony of Her Britannic Majesty's powerful Ally.89)
87) C. D. Cowan, Nz'neteenth Century lI:falaya. 1961. 16-17,62, and Brailey, op. cit.) 155. No further teak
forest leases were issued to Westerners after the crisis of the mid-1860's until the 1880's.
88) Mongkut to Consul Fowle, 25th April 1865. IPF, vol. 78. A similar suggestion appears in Wilson
op. cit., 391-2, Si Suriyawong to D. K. Mason, 6th February 1865.
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Thus, rather than accept French dismemberment of his country, or, presumably, attempt
any significant governmental reorganization, King Mongkut was prepared to consider a
British protectorate. Fortunately for him, the extreme French pressure that prompted these
letters ended soon after with the absolute cession of Cambodia, for the reaction of British
officials, both in London and Bangkok, was to dismiss the idea out of hand.90)
Nevertheless, the period since 1850, during which active British policy towards Siam had
been determined largely by the needs of the rather limited British commercial interests trading
with Bangkok, was about to end, and the Siamese were to be presented with new British
challenges.
In 1870, the Indian Government suddenly became seriously concerned about a dramatic
slump in the teak trade upon which the prosperity of the port of Moulmein depended. This
was caused by disorder in the Salween valley. But influenced also, perhaps, by the sort of
French activity mentioned above, and by a renewed interest in overhnd trade wIth China,
it abandoned at last its policy of non-interference east of Burma, despatched an officer to
Chiengmai, and even entertained plans for the recognition of Chiengmai's independence, or
alternatively, the replacement of Foreign Office representatives in Bangkok by members
of its own Political Service.9I) Very soon after, in 1873, the Colonial Office in London sent
Sir Andrew Clarke to Singapore, and within a couple of years, saw its energetic new Governor
initiate the 'Resident' system in three of the Malay States, and effectively extend the mantle
of British paramountcy over most of the rest. With regard to the neighbouring Siamese
dependencIes, British Indian and Malayan officials were motivated primanly by a desire to
see peace on their common borders and the unrestricted expansion of trade,92) and neither
then, nor during the rest of the century, does any suggestion seem to have been articulated
in official circles of British annexation of Siam as a whole, or indeed of Western Laos. Siam's
authority over its Malay dependencies was sometimes disputed, and territorial accessions
were expected in this area if the French continued to encroach in the east. But most im-
portantly, the Siamese did enjoy throughout in their efforts of preserve their independence
and territorial integrity, the crucial support of the British Foreign Office, which recognized
the value of Siam in the world context as a bufferstate, provided that its rulers displayed a
realistic adaptability in response to more moderate Western demands. Thus, the Siamese
still had a breathing-space through from 1867 until, in 1885, following their annexation of
the rest of Vietnam, the French renewed their pressure, presenting to the British Government
a proposal for the division of Siam into two spheres of influence.93) (To be continued)
89) Mongkut to Consul Knox, 18th December 1866. F.O. 69/40. See also A. L. Moffat, Mongkut, the
King oj Siam. 1961, 118-119.
90) Knox to Lord Stanley, 25th December 1866. F.O. 69/40.
91) Chief Commr. Fytche's Secretary Wheeler to Indian Government Secretary Aitchison, 16th July 1870,
and Aitchison to Fytche, December 1870. F.O. 69/53. 5
92) E. Thio, British Policy in the .Malay Peninsula, 1880-1910. 1969. Vol. I, Introduction. The idea
of political expansion up the peninsula was specifically rejected by Colonial Office officials in December
1886. cf. P. Loh, The Malay States, 1877-95. 1971. 65.
93) Apparently around September 1885, but later expanded. cf. I PSHC (India Political and Secret Home
Correspondence), vo1. 94, p. 1677.
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